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A Stakeholder Perspective on Buyer-Supplier Conflict 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to investigate how stakeholder power and an organization’s pursuit of 
legitimacy influence its reaction to conflict with a supplier. We conduct an empirical study 
among travel agents and tour operators to test the relationship between conflict and 
stakeholder power and legitimacy derived from three different stakeholders. Our findings 
imply that power has a dual role. Whereas supplier power reduces buyer-supplier conflict, 
stakeholder power increases it. Moreover, this study shows that the quest to achieve greater 
legitimacy from the firm’s competitive arena increases conflict. This paper is one of the few 
that test stakeholder theory empirically. We demonstrate that stakeholder theory provides 
additional explanations above the hitherto taken dyadic approach towards understanding 
conflict. This paper also shows that power can simultaneously reduce and increase conflict 
depending on which party possesses power. Greater supplier power decreases conflict while 
greater stakeholder power and stakeholder derived legitimacy increases it. Therefore, 
organizations have to balance their stakeholder and supplier interests.
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Channel conflict received considerable interest in the 1970s and 1980s and significant 
advancements have been made towards its understanding. Conflict results when one party 
perceives that its interests or goals are being opposed, impeded or negatively influenced by 
the other party (Jap and Ganesan, 2000). Much of the existing literature explains channel 
conflict based on the power of one channel member over another, thereby approaching 
channel conflict as a dyadic issue (Schul and Babakus, 1988, Gaski, 1984, Hibbard et al., 
2001). However, relationships between organizations do not operate in isolation. In their 
cooperation, third parties, such as customers or competitors, may influence buyers and 
suppliers. For example, Apple has had long lasting conflict with a number of music 
companies about digital rights management.1 Apple’s iTunes store, a reseller of music, 
wanted to sell digital music without the copy protection mechanisms the music companies 
insisted on. In 2007 Apple responded to this conflict by dropping digital rights management 
for some of its music offerings with the argument being that customers’ power, as customers 
could choose alternative offerings without copy protection, was a major reason for their 
move. Similarly, in 2003 Marriott hotels faced the discounted sale of hotel rooms by Expedia 
(at the time owned by Interactive Corp.).2 Marriott engaged in conflict with Interactive Corp. 
by introducing a lowest price guarantee for customers booking a room directly from them. 
The power that customers as important stakeholders have to choose for the lowest price 
available was an important trigger of Marriott’s reaction to this buyer-seller conflict. 
Whereas the literature on channel conflict in marketing suggests that supplier power in 
dyadic relations is likely to reduce a buyers’ response to conflict (e.g., Anderson & Weitz 
1989), the role of stakeholders on conflict has rarely been considered yet can be important as 
the above examples illustrate. The reason for this importance is that engaging in conflict with 
a supplier can satisfy a powerful stakeholder or enhance the firm’s acceptance by a 
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stakeholder (i.e. enhance legitimacy). As such, it may be beneficial for an organization to 
engage in conflict. Consequently, adopting an extra-dyadic perspective to study channel 
conflict may augment our understanding of the drivers of conflict. In this paper, we therefore 
address how stakeholders outside of the buyer-supplier relationship such as customers, 
competitors, and industry associations influence conflict between a buyer and its supplier. We 
do so from the perspective of a buyer and focus on the severity of the organization’s response 
in terms of how firm, uncompromising, tough, and decisive the reaction to a conflict issue 
with its supplier is. 
Recent advancements in the understanding of networks have allowed us to study channel 
phenomena, including channel conflict, beyond the dyadic perspective. In particular 
stakeholder theory is well suited as stakeholder theory is about managing conflict stemming 
from divergent interests (Frooman, 1999, Voss et al., 2005). Moreover, stakeholder theory 
identifies which groups influence a focal organization and which managerial action is taken 
in response to those groups (Freeman, 1984). As such, stakeholder theory offers insight into 
the processes by which intra-dyadic issues, such as buyer-supplier conflict, are influenced by 
others who may have divergent interests (Frooman, 1999). Because we study how customers, 
competitors, and suppliers influence conflict, we contribute to the understanding of the top 
Marketing Science Institute research priority for 2006-2008, which is to advance the 
understanding of connections between suppliers, buyers, customers, and competitors 
(Marketing Science Institute, 2006). 
Moreover, by using stakeholder theory to investigate channel conflict we answer to the many 
calls to expand channel research to include extra-dyadic perspectives (e.g., Levy and Grewal, 
2000, Frazier, 1999). More specifically, it allows us to investigate if power and legitimacy, 
two core concepts in stakeholder theory, provide additional explanatory power over the 
hitherto investigated power-conflict relationship in an intra-dyadic setting. Unlike in a dyadic 
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setting, we show that power can simultaneously positively and negatively influence conflict 
depending on which party holds power. Furthermore, we show that legitimacy sought from 
stakeholders provides a reason why conflict may be rational as organizations strive not only 
for economic but also social fitness (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002). An additional 
contribution of the present research is that we investigate whether stakeholder theory can be 
usefully applied empirically to relatively common organizational issues, such as a firm’s 
reaction to conflict, rather than specific issues, such as boycotts, that have characterized much 
of the previous stakeholder research. 
Next, we present our conceptual arguments on how conflict can be explained. We then 
discuss the empirical study, set in the context of the travel industry. We conclude with results 
and their implications. 
Hypotheses 
 
The dyadic perspective: the influence of supplier power on supplier-buyer conflict 
The marketing literature on channel conflict has been dominated by studies taking dyadic 
perspectives and overwhelmingly this research suggests that power is a major antecedent of 
channel conflict in buyer-supplier relationships (Gaski 1984). Although we recognize that 
there has been some discussion on the direction of the power-conflict relationship (Etgar 
1978), there are strong arguments to expect greater relative supplier power to reduce a 
buyer’s response to conflict. First, organizations that are more powerful usually possess vital 
resources. This makes it difficult for the exchange partner to retaliate to any conflict started 
as it may threaten the availability of the very resource on which it is dependent. Second, an 
increased noncoercive power of one party over another increases incentives for cooperation 
and normalization of the exchange relationship, which in turn tempers manifest conflict 
(Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994). Moreover, research in psychology has also shown that if there 
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is a greater relative power of one party over another, conflict is reduced (Lawler et al., 1988). 
Hence, 
 
H1: Relative supplier power decreases the severity of the buyer’s reaction to conflict with 
that supplier. 
 
The extra-dyadic perspective: the influence of stakeholder power and legitimacy on supplier-
buyer conflict 
Effects from outside of the dyadic, buyer-seller, relationship may influence conflict. We 
propose that, even controlling for the effect of relative supplier power, having more powerful 
stakeholders increases conflict. Stakeholders are defined as any group or individual who can 
influence, or is influenced by, the achievement of the organization’s objectives (Freeman, 
1984). As this definition is very broad, subsequent scholars have narrowed the definition of 
stakeholders down to those individuals or groups who possess power, legitimacy, or urgency 
relative to an organization. It is also this “narrow view” that we adopt in this paper. 
Stakeholder theory was introduced by Freeman (1984) to study the conflict organizations face 
in satisfying the needs of shareholders that wanted high returns, while simultaneously using 
strategies to reach that end that were deemed acceptable by various individuals, 
organizations, and groups (Harrison and Freeman, 1999). Thus stakeholder theory is about 
conflicts between self-interest and “other regarding” interest (Agle et al., 1999). One of the 
key issues this theory focuses on is if, and how, stakeholders influence organizational 
outcomes (Berman et al., 1999, Harrison and Freeman, 1999). Stakeholder theory suggests 
that the means stakeholders have to influence organizational outcomes are based on power 
and legitimacy because without having at least some legitimacy or power, a stakeholder 
cannot influence a focal organization (Mitchell et al., 1997). Based upon previous research 
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(Maignan and McAlister, 2003) and interviews with five managers in the travel industry, 
competitors, customers, and the industry association were identified as important 
stakeholders. That is, based on the interviews, competitors, customers, and the industry 
association appeared to have power and/or legitimacy relative to most travel agents and tour 
operators). Consequently, we take power and legitimacy for each of the three identified 
stakeholders into account. In figure 1 we show each of these stakeholders and also show how 
we expect these stakeholders to impact conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The effects of stakeholder on conflict 
 
Power in a dyadic setting is the relative strength of organization A over B. In a network 
setting, stakeholders can influence a focal organization if they possess some degree of power 
(Maignan and Ferrell, 2004, Oliver, 1991). This stakeholder power becomes especially 
important if stakeholders have divergent interests, for example if customers wish to lower 
prices and an industry association seeks to increase prices. Power originates from the 
possession of important resources controlled by stakeholders such as expertise, coordination, 
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and a target market, and stakeholders can influence organizations by withholding or 
threatening to withhold such resources. Because of this power, stakeholders can pressure an 
organization to do something its exchange partner may not necessarily want, thereby causing 
conflict with that partner (i.e. supplier). As powerful stakeholders are more salient to 
managers they are more likely to act upon pressure initiated by powerful stakeholders in 
order to satisfy their demand (Agle et al., 1999). Moreover, based on conflict spiral theory, 
one would expect that greater power of stakeholders result in increasing conflict between 
buyers and sellers. Conflict spiral theory suggests that retaliation is a central aspect of 
conflict where actions of one party (i.e. stakeholders) cause another party to retaliate. More 
precisely, the likelihood that stakeholders will introduce conflict issues, and the expectancy 
of an organization that this stakeholder will do so, increase if the stakeholder has more 
relative power over the organization (Lawler et al., 1988). The argument to this is that if 
stakeholders have more power, they are more tempted to use it because they expect a low 
likelihood of retaliation by the other party. However, once they use this power the 
organization may be tempted to retaliate to other parties. This greater use of their power can 
cause greater conflicts between the buyer and seller as stakeholder demands (e.g. adhering to 
industry regulations) can be conflicting to the functioning of the buyer-seller relationship 
(Kumar et al., 1998). An example where conflict between a buyer and seller was increased 
due to a powerful stakeholder is the case of StarKist where Frooman (1999) described how 
StarKist was pressured by an environmental group to change the way how suppliers of 
StarKist caught fish. In turn, StarKist pressured its suppliers, to change their fishing methods. 
The environmental group used their power in this case (by means of asking for consumer 
boycotts) to pressure StarKist to engage in conflict with its suppliers even though, as 
Frooman (1999), described these suppliers were very powerful. 
Overall, we expect that more powerful stakeholders can increase channel conflict: 
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H2a: Power of an industry association increases the severity of a buyer’s reaction to 
conflict. 
H2b: Power of competitors increases the severity of a buyer’s reaction to conflict. 
H2c: Power of customers increases the severity of a buyer’s reaction to conflict. 
 
In networks, organizations strive to enhance their perceived attractiveness (Anderson et al., 
1994). This perceived attractiveness is the extent to which a firm believes that engaging in an 
exchange relation with a partner firm has, in addition to the effect on outcomes within the 
relation, an advantageous effect on the attractiveness of an organization as an exchange 
partner. As firms strive to enhance their attractiveness as an exchange partner so do they 
strive to obtain legitimacy. Legitimacy is defined as a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, or definitions (Suchman, 1995). Seeking 
legitimacy is important as it helps organizations in 3 ways. Firstly, legitimacy, through the 
acceptance of an organization by its environment, facilitates operating in that environment. 
Secondly, seeking legitimacy also increases stability of the organization (Suchman, 1995, 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which is something most organizations value. This stability of 
organizations is derived from the increase in trustworthiness, understanding, and credibility 
(Suchman, 1995) accruing from actions that are deemed to be legitimate. Thirdly, if a 
reaction to conflict is perceived to be a legitimate action, this will have an anticipated 
constructive effect on the attractiveness of an organization because the consequence is the 
acceptance of an organization by its environment (Deephouse, 1996). Seeking legitimacy 
may thus increase the severity of response to conflict. An example of how stakeholders can 
increase conflict is Virgin’s reaction to the prices offered by music companies.3 The conflict 
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issue was over the differential pricing of music by a number of music companies where 
Virgin felt it got a worse deal than its competitors did. Virgin’s reaction to this conflict was to 
withhold payments to these music companies with the argument being that key stakeholders 
to Virgin, its competitors, got a better pricing deal. Thereby Virgin sought legitimacy for 
their claim of unfair pricing by referring to what its competitors get. If engaging in conflict, 
such as in the Virgin example, enhances legitimacy, it may provide a reason as to why 
conflict is beneficial and in the self-interest of organizations. The functionality of channel 
conflict has been acknowledged by many scholars (Brown and Day, 1981), but little attention 
is given as to what this functionality is. We suggest that an organization’s quest for 
legitimacy may provide just such a reason as to why reacting to conflict may be functional. 
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H3a: Seeking legitimacy from an industry association increases the severity of a buyer’s 
reaction to conflict.  
H3b: Seeking legitimacy from competitors increases the severity of a buyer’s reaction to 
conflict. 
H3c: Seeking legitimacy from customers increases the severity of a buyer’s reaction to 
conflict. 
Research Method 
 
We study the influence of stakeholders on the severity of reactions to conflict in the context 
of travel agents and tour operators in the Netherlands (SIC codes 4724 and 4725) which is 
also our sampling frame. This context is appropriate to study conflict because as it recently 
experienced a number of conflict issues, which facilitates respondents’ recall. Moreover, the 
context of travel agents and tour operators is one where substantial variation exist in the size 
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of its suppliers, thereby suggesting variation in the power these suppliers can exercise over 
these travel agents and tour operators. Moreover, substantial variation exists in the size of 
these agents and tour operators and their customers (ranging from individual travelers buying 
a single ticket to large corporate accounts), as well as that multiple industry associations 
exists. All, this suggests variation in the power these possible stakeholders have. 
As an initial step in the data collection process, we conducted interviews among travel 
agencies and their suppliers. This provided a general insight into the conflict issues present in 
the industry, as well as into their causes and consequences from both perspectives. The 
interviews revealed that both the buyer and supplier had a very similar perception of the 
issues over which they have conflict. These issues are similar to those found in previous 
research such as a lack of product or service availability, increases in prices charged, efforts 
of the supplier to sell products directly (i.e. the threat of disintermediation), and customer 
complaints that were passed on to the supplier. 
Data Collection Procedure 
 
The data were gathered using mail surveys based on the process lined out by Dillman (2000). 
Using the Dutch chamber of commerce database, we selected all organizations that were 
economically active from SIC codes 4724 and 4725. Subsequently we called these 
organizations to 1) verify details, 2) ask for cooperation, and 3) ask for the name of an 
informant which, on the basis of a small number of prior interviews we identified as the CEO 
or director for smaller companies and the marketing or sales manager for larger companies. 
We approached these informants at the national level, and consequently had no more than 
one response per organization (defined at the legal level). We sent the questionnaires to 458 
informants and a net response of 116 surveys, or 25%, was obtained. As channel conflict is 
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generally considered a sensitive subject, this response rate is satisfactory and compares 
favorably to the response obtained from most other channel studies. 
 
Tests between early and late respondents revealed no differences between the characteristics 
of the organizations that were surveyed including organizational size and informant tenure 
and competence. Thus on the basis of the ideas of Armstrong and Overton (1977) 
nonresponse bias does not appear to be a problem. A stronger test was carried out to see if the 
population drawn from SIC codes 4724 and 4725 of the chamber of commerce database 
differs significantly from the sample obtained by comparing organizational size. We 
compared the average size of firms included in the chamber of commerce database to our 
sample obtained but found no difference, thus concluding that our sample appears 
representative of the population. In Table 1 we show organizational size statistics for our 
sample and the population. 
The informants we surveyed were on average over 10 years in their current function, which is 
an indicator of their competency on the subject (Kumar et al., 1993). Consistent with this, the 
informants considered themselves to be knowledgeable about the relationships with the major 
suppliers of the organization (average=5.7/7-point Likert scale where 7 is the highest score). 
No responses from informants were deleted based on their reported competency. 
Measurement 
 
Multi-item measures are available for all the constructs necessary to test the hypotheses. An 
overview of all measures, together with the Cronbach alpha of the scale can be found in 
Appendix 1. In Table 1 we show a correlation matrix of all the constructs, together with their 
means and standard deviations and a number of sample and population statistics. 
-----------------------------------------------Take in Table (No. 1)----------------------------------------------- 
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Severity of conflict reaction is the severity of the response of the buyer over a conflict issue 
and is based on the scale of Antia and Frazier (2001). This scale assesses how firm, 
uncompromising, tough, and decisive the reaction to a conflict issue was. On average 
informants indicated, on a scale ranging from 4-28, a severity of 19.77. Notice that this scale 
measures the severity of response and not if this response was positive or negative.  
Power is based on the 2-item scale proposed by Ganesan which measures the supplier’s or 
stakeholder’s relative power over the buyer (1993). This scale is extended with one new item 
on the relative power of a supplier or stakeholder over the buyer. Care was taken that this 
additional item is consistent with Ganesan’s power definition.  
Legitimacy has been operationalized in two slightly different ways in the previous literature. 
Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfield (1999) operationalize the construct of legitimacy in the light 
of appropriateness and properness while Grewal, Comer, and Mehta (2001) operationalize 
legitimacy in terms of how actions would portray the organization towards other 
organizations. Consistent with our focus on explaining behavior we adopted Grewal, Comer, 
and Mehta’s scale. We define legitimacy as a generalized perception that the actions of an 
organization are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995). Consistent with Grewal, Comer, and 
Mehta’s scale the first two items measure the extent to which organizations mimic other 
organizations while the third item measures legitimacy as a motive. 
We control for conflict attribution as in a network context the blame for conflict determines 
how it is evaluated and reacted to (Frazier, 1983). These attributions are most commonly 
classified in terms of self, partner, or external attribution (Scheer and Stern, 1992, Hibbard et 
al., 2001). As issues introduced by the buyer will not lead to reactions by this buyer, we focus 
on partner and external attribution. Both variables are measured using the 3-item scales of 
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Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern (2001). These scales reflect who is responsible for the conflict 
from the perspective of the buyer. 
 
We calculated Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient to assess consistency and found coefficients that 
were satisfactory (ranging from .70 to .91). An assessment of unidimensionality using 
principal component analysis resulted in one-dimensional scales, which supports that we 
measure one underlying dimension per construct. We conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis to assess fit of the indicators with the constructs. The resulting model (χ2=579.10, 
DF=319, RMSEA=0.076, CFI=0.89) fits reasonably well. 
Using the procedure of Fornell and Larcker (1981) we tested for discriminant validity of our 
measures by comparing the variance extracted from each pair of constructs to the squared 
correlation of the two constructs. Because in every case the variance extracted exceeded the 
squared correlation of the constructs, our results indicate that our measures display 
discriminant validity. The average variances extracted range from .50 to .87 (see diagonal of 
Table 1) and are acceptable. 
Results 
 
We tested the hypotheses described previously using ordinary least squares. The results are 
shown in Table 2. 
-----------------------------------------------Take in Table (No. 2)----------------------------------------------- 
The findings suggest that increased power of the seller is associated with a weaker reaction to 
conflict, confirming extant research and supporting Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 states that we 
expect stakeholder power to increase reactions to channel conflict. We find support that 
customer power (H2c) indeed increases channel conflict. Hypothesis 3 states that seeking 
stakeholder legitimacy increases channel conflict. We find support that seeking competitor 
legitimacy (H3b) indeed increases channel conflict. The effect sizes of customer power and 
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competitor legitimacy on the severity of conflict reaction (0.22 and 0.26 respectively) 
indicate relatively strong effects. Our findings suggest that one potential stakeholder, the 
industry association, has no influence but that the two other stakeholders, customers and 
competitors, do influence conflict, even if we control for the origin of the conflict. We find 
no empirical support to suggest that both legitimacy and power of one stakeholder 
simultaneously influence the focal organization to react to channel conflict. 
A number of tests were carried out to analyze all interactions between the different 
attributions, power, and the stakeholder attributes but no patterns could be found. 
Discussion 
 
This research conforms to the calls of several channel studies to expand beyond the dyadic 
perspective that characterizes most existing marketing channel research. We show that 
stakeholder theory can be usefully applied to marketing channel research and that using a 
stakeholder approach provides additional insights over a dyadic approach. Specifically we 
find that the role of power differs for dyadic and extra-dyadic approaches. In a dyadic 
approach, more power of the partner is associated with a less severe reaction to conflict and 
in an extra-dyadic approach more power of a stakeholder is associated with a stronger 
response to conflict. The reason why we find that supplier power decreases conflict, while 
stakeholder power increases it may lie in the fact that it is generally easier to retaliate towards 
suppliers than it is towards stakeholders (Lawler et al., 1988). Moreover, the argument of 
conflict spiral theory is stronger if parties are more committed to use whatever power they 
have to reach their goals. Stakeholders may be more likely to use their power than suppliers 
because by their very nature suppliers are partially dependent on the business they do with 
their buyers whereas stakeholder may depend less on the organizations they are trying to 
influence. 
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In addition, stakeholder theory allows us to identify the importance of legitimacy in 
explaining channel conflict. We find some support for the notion that seeking legitimacy is a 
motive for firms to react to channel conflict. As such, stakeholder theory provides an 
important mechanism to explain why conflict may be rational. According to Anderson, 
Håkansson, and Johanson (1994), firms aim to increase their attractiveness as an exchange 
partner. The constructive effects of seeking legitimacy, including an increased likelihood of 
organizational survival, acceptance of its environment, and an increased stability of the 
organization, may make an organization more attractive as an exchange partner. As we find 
power and legitimacy to influence conflict, we find support for Grewal and Dharwadkar’s 
(2002) proposition that power and legitimacy of the network surrounding the organization 
influence intra-dyadic processes. Moreover, these findings also show that stakeholder theory 
can be usefully applied empirically for investigating conflict. 
We found no effect of power or legitimacy with respect to the industry association. One 
possible explanation for this may be that the importance organizations attach to the industry 
association is much less than either that of their competitors or customers, which both are 
stakeholders that more directly influence the bottom line. This finding is in line with a 
‘narrow view’ on stakeholders where only those organizations of direct economic relevance 
are deemed stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). Consistent with the notion of market 
orientation that customers and competitors are at the core of a firm’s orientation towards its 
environment (Narver and Slater, 1990), managers react to conflict more severely in the event 
that their customers are more powerful or that the firm can derive legitimacy from its 
competitors by doing so.  
Managerial Implications 
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Channel conflict is a pervasive issue in many buyer-seller relationships. Although conflict 
usually has a negative connotation, our findings suggest that there is a positive side to conflict 
as conflict can enhance a firm’s legitimacy. That is, conflict may increase the acceptance to 
certain stakeholders of an organization. We find that particularly the acceptance of an 
organization by its competitors is enhanced if a firm reacts more strongly to conflict. This 
finding points out that regardless of the positive or negative effects of conflict in the  buyer-
seller relationship itself, conflict may have beneficial effects (increase legitimacy, the 
acceptance of an organization) outside of it. 
We also find that conflict in the same buyer-seller relationship may increase due to powerful 
stakeholders that the organization faces. The conflicting demands that these stakeholders may 
place on how these buyer-seller relationships operate may cause that conflict issues are 
reacted to more severely than would happen if these stakeholders were not present. This 
implies that firms should be aware that partners facing relatively powerful stakeholders may 
be difficult to deal with due to the presence of powerful stakeholders. Our findings suggest 
especially a firm’s customers are powerful stakeholders in the context of tour operators and 
travel agents. 
Limitations and Issues for Further Research 
 
As with nearly every other piece of research several limitations apply. A first limitation 
relates to the scope of the study. Our research identifies only the role that stakeholders have 
on conflict in a buyer-seller relationship. Conflict can also take place with organizations other 
than the supplier. For reasons of parsimony, we have not included such cases in our analysis 
but the basic model could be easily adjusted to accommodate this. Our focus on a single 
country bars us from identifying a possible role of the government as a stakeholder and 
country characteristics could give rise to idiosyncrasies that cannot be assessed using the 
current data. Also other stakeholders such as environmental groups or communities (See 
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Maignan et al., 2005 for an overview of various stakeholder groups) could influence channel 
conflict. 
As we conducted our study in a single country and a single industry, generalization of this 
study could be an issue. For example in certain industries customers may have very little 
power. By collecting data in other industries the generalizability of the findings could be 
tested. 
Finally our study uses a single informant. Because the dependent variable of our study is 
manifest, and therefore more factual, the single source issue may be less of an issue 
(Summers, 2001). 
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Appendix 1: Measurement Scales 
 
Construct Items Cronbach Alpha 
Severity of 
conflict reaction 
Our response to this conflict was firm. .70 
Our response to this conflict was uncompromising.  
Our response to this conflict was tough.  
Our response to this conflict was decisive.  
Supplier power This supplier is more powerful than us. .78 
In our relationship with this organization they have more 
power 
 
This organization can force decisions upon usa.  
Power customers The customers are more powerful than us. .84 
In our relationship with our customers they have more power  
The customers can force decisions upon us.  
Power competitors The competitors are more powerful than us. .86 
In our relationship with our competitors they have more 
power. 
 
The competitors can force decisions upon us.  
Power industry The industry association is more powerful than us. .79 
In our relationship with the industry association they have 
more power. 
 
The industry association can force decisions upon us.  
Legitimacy 
customers 
It would provide legitimacy to us with respect to our 
customers. 
.91 
The best companies behave like this towards our customers.  
It would portray us towards customers as an organization that 
reacts strongly to conflicts. 
 
Legitimacy 
competitors 
It would provide legitimacy to us with respect to our 
competitors. 
.88 
The best competitors behave like this.  
It would portray us towards our competitors as an 
organization that reacts strongly to conflicts. 
 
Legitimacy 
industry 
It would provide legitimacy to us with respect to the industry 
association. 
.87 
The best companies within the industry association behave 
like this. 
 
It would portray us towards the industry association as an 
organization that reacts strongly to conflicts. 
 
Partner attribution The supplier undertook the action because they tend look out 
for their own interests, not ours. 
.89 
The supplier is self-centered, and this accounts for their action 
that led to conflict. 
 
The supplier’s act that led to conflict was intended to benefit 
them, not ours. 
 
External 
attribution 
Competitive conditions forced the supplier to take the action 
that led to conflict. 
.79 
The behavior of our supplier leading to the conflict was 
understandable given the market conditions in our area. 
 
The current environment was responsible for actions of the 
supplier leading to conflict. 
 
Note: all items were measured using a seven-point Likert scales ranging from completely disagree to completely 
agree. 
a: Newly added item. 
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Table 1: Correlations, Means, and Variances of the Constructs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Severity of conflict reaction 0.50a          
2. Supplier power -0.25 0.67         
3. Power industry -0.01 0.20 0.70        
4. Power competitors -0.18 0.39 0.16 0.77       
5. Power customers 0.11 0.12 -0.09 0.27 0.80      
6. Legitimacy industry 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.81     
7. Legitimacy competitors 0.24 0.13 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.67 0.82    
8. Legitimacy customers 0.11 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.21 0.64 0.66 0.87   
9. Partner attribution 0.14 0.29 -0.03 0.08 0.04 -0.05 0.06 -0.06 0.83  
10. External attribution 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.16 -0.19 0.18 0.12 0.12 -0.04 0.68 
Mean 19.77 14.09 14.47 10.06 12.55 10.77 12.04 12.04 15.07 10.59 
Standard deviation 3.73 4.28 3.77 4.00 3.94 4.10 3.95 4.20 3.94 4.16 
POPULATION DESCRIPTORS 
Number of organizations in SIC codes 4724 and 4725 N=6032 
Organizational size 1-10 employees 72%, 11-100 employees 23%, 101 or more employees 5%. 
Legal form limited liability 54%, sole proprietorship 32%, partnerships 4%, other (including foreign legal forms) 10% 
Age of the organization (rounded to whole years) average=13.89, standard deviation=18.40,  minimum=0, maximum=184 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTORS 
Tenure of informant at company average=10.33, standard deviation=8.49, minimum=1/2, maximum=41 
Self-rated competency of informant average=5.74, standard deviation=.94, minimum=1, maximum7 
Organizational size 1-10 employees 69%, 11-100 employees 28%, 101 or more employees 3%. 
Function of informant director or CEO 63%, marketing or sales manager 19%, other 17%. 
a: Diagonal values are average variances extracted 
  
 
Table 2: Regression Analysis Results 
 
Dependent variable: 
Severity of conflict reaction 
Expected 
sign 
Standardized 
coefficient 
t-value 
 
 
Constant 
    
6.31*** 
    
Supplier power - (H1) -0.37 -3.73 *** 
    
Power industry + (H2a)  0.10  1.07 
Power competitors + (H2b) -0.15 -1.55 
Power customers + (H2c)  0.22  2.28 ** 
    
Legitimacy industry + (H3a)  0.13  0.98 
Legitimacy competitors + (H3b)  0.26  2.05 ** 
Legitimacy customers + (H3c) -0.19 -1.49 
    
Control variables    
Partner attribution +  0.24  2.64 *** 
External attribution +  0.15  1.65* 
    
F-value (9,106) 
Observations 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
Root MSE 
3.85 
116 
0.25 
0.18 
3.37 
 
   
* P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01, T-tests are two-sided 
  
 
Endnotes: 
1: See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6337275.stm, accessed 3/11/2007. 
2: See http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2003/tc20031118_6129_tc047.htm, accessed 
6/3/2007. 
3: See http://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/05/09/virgin_carrys_out_payment_freeze/ accessed 24th July 2006 
